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Climate Club Futures:  
On the Effectiveness of Future Climate Clubs 
William Nordhaus1 




A proposal to combat free-riding in international climate agreements is the 
notion of a “climate club” or coalition of countries to encourage high levels of 
participation. Empirical models of climate clubs in the early stages relied on 
the analysis of single-period coalition formation. The results suggested that 
there were limits on the potential strength of clubs and that it would be 
difficult to have deep abatement strategies in the club framework. The 
current work extends the single-period approach to many periods and 
develops an approach analyzing “supportable policies” to analyze multi-
period clubs. The major surprise of the study is the interaction between the 
club structure and rapid technological change. Neither alone will produce 
incentive-compatible policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of 
international climate policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological 
decarbonization will be too costly to produce highly costly abatement; 
similarly, rapid technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep 
abatement because of country free-riding. But the two together can achieve 
the international objectives. 
  
 
1 The author is grateful for helpful comments from many researchers and 
colleagues. Particular thanks go to Scott Barrett, who pioneered work on the 
economics of treaties. Others who made valuable suggestions were Ken 
Gillingham, Robert Keohane, Matt Kotchen, Robert Mendelsohn, and Martin 
Weitzman. The research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation 
and the U.S. Department of Energy. All views and errors are the responsibility of 







Early research on climate clubs 
Global agreements on climate change date back to the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997, yet little substantial coordinated abatement has taken place. Free-
riding is a major hurdle in the solution of global externalities, and it is at the 
heart of the failure to deal with climate change. Without an appropriate 
structure, no single country has an incentive to cut its emissions sharply. 
Moreover, if there is an agreement, nations have a strong incentive not to 
participate. If they do participate, there is a further incentive to miss 
ambitious objectives. The outcome is a non-cooperative free-riding equilibrium in 
which few countries undertake strong climate-change policies – a situation 
that closely resembles the current international policy environment. Nations 
speak loudly but carry no stick at all. 
One proposal to combat free-riding is the notion of a “climate club” or 
coalition of countries to encourage high levels of participation and 
abatement. The idea, analyzed in Nordhaus (2015), is that nations can 
overcome the syndrome of free-riding in international climate agreements if 
they adopt the club model rather than voluntary arrangements. The central 
feature of the club model is that nations would be penalized if they did not 
meet their obligations.  
The club model analyzed here centers on an “international target 
carbon price” that is the focal provision of the agreement. (The power of the 
price as a single instrument has been shown in Weitzman 2015.) For example, 
countries might agree that each country will implement policies that produce 
a minimum domestic carbon price of $50 per metric ton of CO2. The target 
price might apply to 2020 and rise over time at, say, 3% per year in real 
terms. 
 Additionally, both theory and history suggest that some form of 
sanction on non-participants is required to induce countries to participate in 
agreements with local costs but diffuse benefits (see particularly Barrett 1994, 
2003). While the exact degree of free-riding and cooperation will differ 
according to the assumptions about coalition formation and stability, most 
theoretical and empirical modeling suggests that reaching a grand bargain of 
most regions with strong abatement will be extraordinarily difficult (Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993, Chandler and Tulkens 1995, Bosetti et al. 2012, Lessmann  
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et al. 2015, Keohane and Victor 2016). Studies of club-like structures can be 
found in Gollier and Tirole (2015), Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (2017), 
Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford (2016), Keohane, Petsonk, and Hanafi 
(2017).  
 The proposal in the climate club was a uniform tariff on all imports of 
non-club countries into the club. Take as an example a penalty tariff of 5%. If 
non-participant country A exports $100 billion into the club region, it would 
be penalized by $5 billion of tariffs. In estimates of the coalition stability of a 
one-shot climate club using the C-DICE model, Nordhaus (2015) estimated 
that climate clubs would be extremely effective (relative to no club) for low 
carbon prices. However, the modeling suggested that it would be difficult to 
support carbon prices above $50 per ton of CO2 with the economic structure 
of the current period (2011 in those estimates).  
However, that analysis was limited to a single period. The reason was 
that the computational complexity of the C-DICE model was too great for a 
full dynamic model.2 The present study tackles the more complex question of 
sustainable climate clubs in a multi-period framework.  
Major results 
Here are the major results. The major tool used here is the concept of a 
supportable policy, whether emissions price, emissions limit, or other constraints on 
producer and consumer behavior. We can interpret supportable policies as ones 
with maximum stringency given the incentives to be in the club (here the 
incentives are tariffs, but they could be other ones). The most important 
example is a supportable carbon price. Policies that have target carbon prices 
lower than the supportable price have lower abatement; policies with higher 
 
2 The original model had 15 regions reflecting actual economic and environmental 
data. Finding a stable coalition is combinatorial in nature, and its solution is 
thought to be in the class of NP-hard problems. There appears to be no efficient 
algorithm for calculating stable coalitions, and current algorithms claim reasonable 
results in time O(n2n). In principle, we would need to take each of the 2n coalitions 
and determine whether they are stable against all the other 2n - 1 coalitions, which 
requires about 22n ≈ 109 comparisons for 15 regions. While this is computationally 
feasible with supercomputers, it is unnecessarily burdensome, particularly for 
model construction and comparison of regimes. The earlier calculations relied on an 
evolutionary algorithm to find stable coalitions. Experiments indicate that stable 
coalitions are usually found within 100 iterations. A full dynamic analysis with 
multiple periods would require > 10100 comparisons and was beyond the capability 
of the analysis. 
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target carbon prices induce countries to drop out of the club and therefore 
also have lower abatement (as countries move to their national targets, which 
are substantially lower and essentially zero). The study defines supportable 
targets, shows how to find them in a simple example, and then develops a 
model which allows calculation of supportable policies over time. 
A second contribution is to develop a simple analytical model of the 
supportable participation of a party in a regime (such as a climate club) that imposes 
costs but also conveys rewards for participation (or avoids punishments for non-
participation). While estimating the equilibrium of a coalition in a dynamic 
framework is computationally extremely burdensome (as noted in footnote 
2), determining supportable policies is relatively simple, both analytically 
and computationally. The simple analytical model below shows that the time 
path of supportable policies for the climate club depends primarily on six 
determinants: openness (the trade-output ratio), the tariff rate, the rate of 
decarbonization, the fraction of the world in the club, the welfare loss per 
unit tariff, and the rate of technological change in the backstop technology. 
Additionally, in the simple model, the growth of output does not affect the 
outcome because it cancels out for costs and benefits. 
 The third contribution is developing a simple global computable model (Trade 
DICE or TDICE) for estimating the supportable carbon prices, emissions, as well as 
the geophysical variables such as concentrations and temperature. The model uses 
much of the structure of the standard DICE model (described below), but 
adds equations that represent the “club” variables such as trade, the gains 
from trade, and the costs of trade sanctions. By combining the different 
components, it is possible to determine the supportable carbon prices and 
emissions where the costs of participating (through abatement) just equal the 
costs of non-participation (the trade sanctions).  
 Fourth, the results of the TDICE model show several features. To begin 
with, in the baseline-parameter scenario for technology and openness, even 
with strong trade sanctions of 10% uniform tariffs for non-participation, 
emissions are slowed sharply in the club relative to no policy but do not attain the 
high levels of abatement that are the objectives of international climate policy. With 
baseline parameters and strong sanctions, industrial emissions in 2050 are 27 
GtCO2, rather than the target of zero. Global temperature in 2100 reaches 3.1 
°C rather than the 1.5 or 2 °C targets. This result confirms the statement in 
Barrett (2018) that the climate club as originally conceived is insufficient to 
attain international objectives. 
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 A fifth finding shows the importance of the combination of the club 
incentives and rapid decarbonizing technological change. As mentioned above, 
two important parameters in the analysis are the rate of decarbonization and 
the rate of technological change in the backstop technology. These provide 
powerful boosts to the club incentive because they lower the cost of 
participation. As a polar and ambitious objective, the model examines the 
club incentives along with a rapid rate of decarbonization (2% per year faster 
than historical rates) as well as a rapid decline in the cost of the backstop 
technology (at 4% per year instead of 0% in the base assumption). With these 
assumptions along with the strong tariff incentive of 10% penalty tariff, 
global emissions in the TDICE model hit zero by 2050 and global 
temperature has a maximum of 1.9 °C. While the combination of a strong 
club and rapid technological change are at the outer edge of realism, they do 
point to a potential political-economic-technology mechanism for attaining 
ambitious climate objectives. 
 A sixth finding comes from developing a regionalized version of the 
model (TRICE, or Trade and RICE). The model is only a sketch of a full 
regional model but allows us to investigate the impacts of regional differences in 
features such as carbon intensities and costs of abatement on supportable policies. 
The TRICE approach indicates that supportable carbon prices differ 
markedly across regions. Taking 2020 as an example, the range is from a low 
of $72/tCO2 for Russia, almost as low for China of $86/tCO2, to $285/tCO2 
for Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia has a low supportable price because of its 
high carbon-intensity, with the converse for Sub-Saharan Africa. The impact 
of regional heterogeneity, as seen by comparing TDICE and TRICE, is to 
lower the global supportable carbon price and supportable emissions 
reductions. The reason is that some of the countries with the largest 
emissions, particularly China and the US, have relatively low supportable 
carbon prices. 
A seventh finding concerns the “carbon price Laffer curve.” This 
shows the relationship between the target carbon price and total emissions 
reductions.  It is hump-shaped: at a carbon price of $0, there are no emissions 
reductions, while at extremely high carbon prices, there is zero participation. 
Using the TRICE model, we calculate the carbon price Laffer curve for 2050 has peak 
emissions reduction at $100/tCO2 for the 5% tariff and $160/ton for the 10% tariff. 
Figure 5 shows the point graphically.  
 Finally, the major surprise of the study is the interaction between the club 
structure and rapid decarbonizing technological change. Neither a club nor rapid 
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technological change by themselves will produce incentive-compatible 
policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of international climate 
policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological decarbonization will 
be too costly to produce highly costly abatement; similarly, rapid 
technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep abatement 
because of country free-riding. But the two together – providing incentives to 
participate but at the same time lowering the costs of participation – are a 
team that, in principle and according to simple modeling, can achieve the 
international objectives.  
 
II. Analytical extension of climate clubs for many periods 
Clubs and international agreements 
We begin with a simplified analysis of a dynamic model of a climate 
club. The present study develops a new approach to the issue by analyzing 
“supportable” policies in climate agreements or climate clubs. Here is the 
basic idea. Many activities have the characteristics of public goods, where the 
benefits are diffuse, or more precisely have some elements of non-exclusivity 
and non-rivalry. The classic example is a lighthouse (or a GPS in the modern 
era), where none are excluded, and where the beacons enjoyed by one do not 
crowd out or exclude others. 
Public goods create a challenge because they are prone to free-riding, 
where some users may enjoy the benefits (light) without paying. 
Governments solve the public-goods problem using their coercive powers of 
taxation to finance public works like lighthouses. For the case of private 
activities, such as recreational or sporting facilities, people can join together 
in clubs, which are a mechanism that allow voluntary agreements to provide 
public goods. What is a club? A club is a voluntary group deriving mutual 
benefits from sharing the costs of producing an activity that has public-good 
characteristics. The gains from a successful club are sufficiently large that 
members will pay dues and adhere to club rules in order to gain the benefits 
of membership.  
The major conditions for a successful club include the following: (1) 
that there is a public-good-type resource that can be shared (whether the 
benefits from a treaty or the enjoyment of a golf course); (2) that the 
cooperative arrangement, including the cost, is beneficial for each of the 
members; (3) that non-members can be excluded or penalized at relatively 
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low cost to members; and (4) that the membership is stable in the sense that 
no one wants to leave.  
From an analytical point of view, international treaties can be viewed 
as clubs. Under the central principles of modern international law, nations 
are sovereign and have the fundamental right of political self-determination. 
The current system requires that countries consent to joining international 
agreements (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent.” Treaty of Vienna, 1969, article 34). All 
international agreements are therefore essentially voluntary 
Given the structure of treaties, we can look to the characteristics of 
clubs to understand what can provide durable international agreements. The 
most important ingredients are that a public-goods treaty, first, imposes costs 
on participants and, second, has sufficient deterrents for non-participants 
that the agreement is stable or self-enforcing.  
As examples, the current international-trade system provides access to 
other countries’ markets with low trade barriers while providing access to 
the home market. For military alliances, the benefits are peace and survival 
while the costs are military spending. In all cases, countries must contribute 
dues – these being low trade barriers for trade or burden sharing in defense 
treaties. The requirement for a successful international system to deal with 
climate change can look to the theory and practice of clubs for its inspiration. 
Modeling supportable policies in a climate club 
The earlier analysis in Nordhaus (2015) found that it would be difficult 
to induce high participation with a carbon price well above $50 per ton of 
CO2 in a one-shot climate game. The full analysis of a multi-period climate 
club appears computationally impossible with combinatorial tools, so the 
present study uses a different approach, which is the analysis of supportable 
policies. These are ones that are on the frontier of what can be supported by 
the club sanctions for non-participation. More specifically, the study analyzes 
“supportable carbon prices,” which are carbon prices that can be supported 
by reasonable penalty tariffs (up to 10% uniform tariff). 
Here is the basic analysis. A rational economic analysis by each 
country will involve a comparison of the costs of the penalty tariffs (if out of 
the club) against costs of the abatement (if in the club). We can write the two 
terms as follows for a typical country. Begin with the losses from the trade 










i(1) Trade loss  = 
where  = participation ratio of countries in the club,  = tariff rate,
 = ratio of trade to GDP,  is GDP, and  = welfare loss per % tariff rate.
T   
The parameters with a subscript i refer to country parameters, while 
those without a subscript are either outside the control of countries (e.g., 
other countries’ participation decisions) or rules of the climate club (e.g., the 
target carbon price and the penalty tariff rate). Equation (1) shows the 
welfare losses from the penalty tariffs. The first four parameters on the right 
are observable data and pose no difficulty. However, the welfare impact of 
trade is extremely complicated and controversial. The research here relies on 
Ossa’s calculations as discussed in Nordhaus (2015), see particularly the 
appendix. The welfare loss is close to linear up to a tariff rate of 10%, so it is 
taken as linear for the present analysis. 
 The second term is the abatement cost for countries who are 
participants. In the simplified model in Nordhaus (2015), abatement cost is 
the following: 






Abatement cost = 
where  = abatement cost parameter in current period,  = parameter
of the cost function, and  = emissions control rate.
 
 In the earlier analysis, β = 2, and that will be followed in the analysis of 
this section. The marginal cost of abatement is equalized to the carbon price, 
which yields: 
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where  = marginal cost of abatement and the carbon price
or carbon tax in a market context, and  = emissions /output ratio.
 
Putting (3) into (2) yields: 
2 2 2(4) ( / 2 ) / 4i i i i i i iY Y     Abatement cost = =  
This can be simplified by substituting in the cost or carbon price of the 
backstop technology, ( )p . This represents the carbon price at which 
emissions are zero and the emissions control rate is 1. This is obtained from 




2 2 2(4') ( / 2 ) /i i i i i iY Y p    Abatement cost = =  
 Many of the parameters are observable ones. GDP and CO2 emissions 
are reported more or less accurately by countries today. The target carbon tax 
rate is a design parameter of the climate club. The cost of the backstop 
technology is highly uncertain but been the subject of detailed research. Note 
that the uncertainties about the parameters are issues that arise for countries 
in deciding whether to participate but are not important for the impact of the 
program on emissions and climate change.  
 The dividing line between participation and non-participation is 
“supportable international target carbon price,” or the target carbon price at 
which the cost of abatement exactly equals the welfare cost of the penalty 
tariff. Equation (5) shows the dividing line where the cost of abatement just 
equals the cost of the tariff. Equation (6) then solves for the supportable 




(5)      /
or
(6)   * ( / )
i i i i i
i i i
Tz Y Y p
p Tz
   




 We can also write this in terms of the supportable emissions control 
rate, μ*. Equation (7) equates the two costs using equations (1) and (2). 
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 A final result is for supportable emissions. Using (8), we have 
* 1/2
(1 )
For simplicity, set 1. Then we have supportable emissions using (8):
(9)   (1 (2 / ) )
i i i i
i
i i i i i i
E Y
Y
E z T p
 





 Equations (6), (8), and (9) indicate that the supportable carbon price, 
emissions, and the emissions-control rate change over time as a function of 
the parameters of the economy. Equation (8) is easier to interpret and will be 
used in what follows. 
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 Begin by taking the time derivative of the logarithm of (8) and denote 
the variable ˆ [ln( )] .x d x dt=  
 
* ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆˆ     0.5( )i i i i iz T p   = + + + − −(10)   
According to (9), the supportable emissions control rate grows at half 
of the rate of growth of the different parameters: the ratio of trade to GDP 
( )iz , the welfare loss per % tariff rate , the penalty tariff rate (T), and the 
participation rate ( ) . The supportable emissions control rate declines at half 
of the rate of decline of the cost of the backstop technology ( )ip  and of the 
carbon-output ratio ( ).i   Also, hardly surprising, the strength of the 
penalties (here, the tariff rate) increases the strength of the system. Note that 
in the simplest model, output growth does not enter the final equations. 
The impact of parameters on supportable emissions is non-linear. 
Calculations show that the elasticities of supportable emissions at a 50% 
emissions control rate with respect to , ,T p  and are, respectively, -1.5, -1.0, 
and -0.5.  
One important insight here, which will be seen important in the 
empirical estimates, is the role of technology in strengthening the club. The 
two technological parameters are the cost of the backstop technology 
(productivity growth in renewables) and the rate of exogenous 
decarbonization (which can operate through many factors such as energy 
efficiency or conservation). These are important factors in strengthening the 
power of the club mechanism. 
The analysis can provide qualitative results, but only empirical club 
modeling can answer the question of the feasibility of climate clubs for 
inducing deep emissions reductions. The next section provides insights from 
empirical modeling. 
 
III. Empirical modeling of participation with trade sanctions 
Overview 
This section moves to a dynamic optimization approach using the 
standard DICE model with trade sanctions included (see Nordhaus 2017 for 
a description of the DICE model). This is called the Trade-DICE, or TDICE 
model, representing the idea that we are integrating the standard DICE 
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integrated assessment model with a trade component. I emphasize that the 
exercise is extremely simple, in the spirit of the analytical approach above, 
and primarily intended to illustrate the power of a climate club to provide 
the glue for an international climate agreement. 
Here is the basic setup. The analysis begins with the standard DICE 
model with two modifications. One is that the parameters are slightly 
changed so that the abatement will represent the optimal behavior of a 
“representative country.” This primarily involves changing the damage 
parameter to reflect the global public-goods character of climate damages. 
The second modification is to add the trade module. As in the example 
above, the country decides whether to join the club with costly abatement, or 
to stay out of the club and experience costly trade penalties.  
The model calculates the supportable target carbon price, emissions 
reductions, and emissions for the representative country. The supportable 
policy is one where the cost of abatement just equals the cost of the trade 
sanction. We can interpret the supportable policies as the maximum possible 
club policy. Policies that have lower target carbon prices obviously have 
lower abatement. Higher target carbon prices induce countries to drop out of 
the club and therefore have lower abatement (as countries move to their 
national targets, which are substantially lower and essentially zero). 
Model details for TDICE 
This section describes the structure of the TDICE model. I assume that 
people are familiar with the DICE model, which is a global model linking 
population, total factor productivity, investment, output, emissions, 
concentrations, climate, impacts, and policy. The TDICE model has two 
major changes from the standard DICE; each will be explained after they are 
described. 
1. The first change is to change the model from a global model to a 
model of a representative country. 
2. The second change is to introduce trade sanctions so that each 
country can weigh the cost of reducing CO2 emissions if in the club 
against the trade sanctions if not in the club. 
Representative country. To transform the global DICE model into a 
stylized regional model requires primarily changing the damage structure. I 
assume that there are ten identical countries each of which is 10% of the 
global economy. The outcome would be identical to the global model if there 
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are no externalities. To incorporate the climate externalities, it is necessary to 
reduce the damages by 90% to reflect the fact that each country gets only 10% 
of the damages. If the model is optimized with the smaller damages, the 
outcome is almost exactly the same as the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium 
in a multi-region model. Each country has the same structure as the global 
economy but has only 10% of the damages. By reducing the damage rate to 
one-tenth of the global total and keeping all other parameters the same, we 
can mimic the behavior of a representative country behaving non-
cooperatively (i.e., maximizing its own welfare). 
Trade sanctions. The other major change is to introduce trade sanctions 
for countries that do not meet the target-carbon-price objective. The formula 
for the cost is provided in equation (1) above. To calculate the supportable 
policies, we add a constraint that abatement cost equals sanctions cost, as 
shown in equation (5). The optimization is then to maximize welfare (quite 
close to minimizing cost) subject to the abatement cost equal the trade-




 TRCeq(t)..            TRC(t)         =e=   Openness(t)*Welfloss*Tariff*fracclub; 
 Abatetradeeq(t)..     TRC(t)         =e=   Abaterat(t); 
 
Here TRC(t) = trade-sanctions costs as a fraction of output; Openness(t) = 
trade/output ratio; Welfloss = welfare lose per unit tariff; Tariff = uniform 
tariff rate; fracclub= fraction of global emission in club; and Abaterat(t) = 
abatement cost as ratio to output.  
 Algorithmics. The program is run for 19 periods (through 2100). The full 
model with 16 regions, 3 tariff rates, 3 rates of decarbonization, and 3 rates of 
backstop decline takes about 3 minutes. No issues of multiple equilibria or 
infeasibility were encountered. 
 Parameter estimates 
 The basic DICE model uses the DICE-2016R3 version. This was the 
2016 model updated to 2018 prices and used in Nordhaus (2019). Major 
parameters were examined in early 2019 to determine whether there were 
significant changes. None were found, so the model was unchanged except 
for some adjustments to clean the code.  
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 Preliminary tests indicated that six parameters would have major 
impacts on the estimates: These were openness (trade-output ratio), the tariff 
rate, the rate of decarbonization, the fraction of the world in the club, the 
welfare loss per unit tariff, and the rate of technological change in the 
backstop technology. 
 Additionally, several parameters were found to be unimportant. These 
are the rate of growth of GDP, the ratio of national to global social cost of 
carbon, and the damage function. Other parameters of the DICE model were 
not tested. 
 Two of the six parameters have a historical record: the carbon ratio 
(CO2/GDP, or i  in the analysis above and sigma in the modeling) and the 
openness ratio (Imports/GDP, or iz  in the analysis above and openness in the 
modeling). Since 1980, these have each been declining at about 2% per year. 
The openness ratio took a sharp drop after the 2008 financial crisis and has 
just recovered, while the carbon ratio has declined steadily over the last few 
years. For purposes of modeling, I assume that openness will resume a 
growing trend, but at a slower rate than the last half century, at 1% per year. 
The rate of decarbonization will be taken at the DICE model assumption of -
1½%/year based on the most recent data. However, we emphasize that 
innovation policy can affect this ratio and examine two alternative values 
that increase decarbonization to -2½ %/year and -3½%/year. 
Another critical policy parameter, but one without a strong empirical 
support, is the price of the backstop technology ( ).p . This can be measured 
indirectly from abatement cost functions of the type shown in equation (2), 
but there are no persuasive data from which to observe the evolution of the 
backstop price. One possible approach is to examine changes in the price of 
renewable (or more precisely non-carbon) energy sources. Estimates in 
Fouquet (2018) indicate that the prices of solar and wind technology have 
declined at between 8 and 10% per year from 1980 to 2015. Nuclear energy 
costs have risen over the period, although the actual changes differ by 
country. Outside of electricity, the data are sparser, although there have been 
gains in transportation and heating. It should be emphasized that these gains 
have been largely in the context of zero carbon prices. 
For the baseline estimates, I assume that the rate of decline of the cost 
of the backstop technology is 0.2% per year. I will examine two alternatives, 
decline rates 2% per year and 4% per year, to emphasize that the evolution of 
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low-carbon technologies is an important component of an effective climate-
change policy. 
Three other parameters are quantitatively important: the tariff rate 
(tariff), fraction of the world in the club (frclub), and the welfare loss per unit 
tariff (welfloss). The tariff rate is an important design features of the climate 
club. We test alternative tariff rates, but the outcome (as seen in the analysis 
above) is that the supportable carbon price is a function of the square root of 
the tariff rate. 
The fraction of the world in the club (frclub) is an endogenous outcome 
variable that is a function of all the other variables. Nordhaus (2015) 
calculated these variables for alternative policies for a single year. The 
current research, however, cannot perform an analysis of stable coalitions, so 
the values of frclub vary from 10% to 90%. The 10% value measures whether 
the club is attractive when it is small, while the 90% value measures its 
stability when virtually all countries are members. 
The welfare loss per unit tariff (welfloss) is a complicated structural 
parameter that is a function of output composition, trade policies, 
transportation costs, product heterogeneity, and other variables. We have 
taken estimates from Ossa (2015), as noted above. The results are sensitive to 
welfloss, but the parameter is not part of either trade or climate policy. 
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize a critical shortcoming 
of the modeling here (and in most other integrated assessment models). This 
is the exogenous feature of technological change. History and empirical 
studies show conclusively the importance of prices and market size on the 
rate and direction of technological change (see particularly Popp 2002, 2004). 
However, with a few exceptions, implementing an empirically based strategy 
for introducing endogenous technological change has proved elusive. Since 
part of the rationale for the climate club is to raise carbon prices, and that 
would be a strong incentive for carbon-saving technological change, we can 
at this stage simply emphasize that the impact of the club structure is 
undervalued in the modeling below because there is no automatic market or 
governmental innovative response to the changing carbon prices. We envision 
further work on this issue, but that will have to wait for another day.  
 IV. Modeling Results for Dynamic Aggregative Climate Club 
  Begin with a word on targets. In the discussion below, we compare the 
results with two normative standards. One is the cost-benefit optimum from 
earlier runs of the DICE model. This run stabilizes temperature at about 3 °C 
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by the end of the century. To attain the optimal path requires stabilizing 
emissions between 25 and 40 billion tons of CO2 emissions per year by mid-
21st century. A second standard, adopted by countries as a target, is limiting 
temperature change to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, this being the “2-
degree limit.” The 2-degree target requires attaining zero emissions by mid-
21st century, with negative emissions after that. Each of these two approaches 
has arguments on each side. Those will not be reviewed here. Rather, the 
point is to determine whether the club will achieve either or both, and under 
what conditions.  These are oversimplified but reasonably accurate ways of 
considering whether a climate club can achieve the desired objectives.  
This section contains the results of the TDICE modeling of the 
dynamics of climate clubs. The parametric assumptions are contained in 
Table 1. The base parameters use the assumptions from the standard DICE 
model with or without the club structure. The second column shows the 
range of assumptions. The last three columns contain assumptions about 



















Carbon club design features
Uniform tariff rate
    No policy 0.1%
    Club 5% 0.1 to 10% 5% 10% 10%
Fraction of world in club    50% 10% to 90% 50% 50% 50%
Technological features
Decline backstop cost per year 0.2% 0.2% to 4% 0.2% 2.0% 4.0%
Rate of decarbonization per year 1.5% 1.5% to 3.5% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5%
Structural parameters
Ratio national to global SCC 10% 5% to 10% 10% 10% 10%
Annual growth rate openness 1% 0% to 2% 1% 1% 1%
Welfare loss of tariffs, fraction of 
national income at 10% tariff
0.40% No variation 0.40% 0.40% 0.40%
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Results for base parameters 
Begin with the runs for the base values of the parameters. These can be 
interpreted as ones in which all TDICE values are at their current levels, with 
no induced technological change or programs to speed the development and 
introduction of low-carbon technologies. Figure 1 shows the sustainable 
emissions with base parameters and penalty tariff rates from 0% to 10%. This 
analysis assumes that a uniform tariff of 10% is the maximum that is 
consistent with maintaining the current world trade system. 
The path associated with 0% tariff is a baseline path with rising 
emissions. The highest penalty tariff stabilizes emissions at around 30 
GtCO2/year but does not meet a target path that would reach zero emissions 
by 2050. This suggests that a base-parameter climate club can achieve the 
optimal path in the next half-century, but it cannot achieve the more 
ambitious objective of the 2-degree target. 
 
 
Figure 1. Sustainable CO2 emissions with base parameters and alternative 
penalty tariffs 
Rapid technological change 
 The analysis in the first section suggested that sustainable emissions 
reductions could be more aggressive with more rapid technological change. 
There are two possible routes for rapid change. One is to lower the cost of 























T = 0% T = 2%
T = 4% T = 6%
T = 8% T = 10%
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the cost of the backstop technology. (The backstop technology is one that can 
replace all carbon fuels and is superabundant, assumed to be about $660 per 
ton of CO2 currently.) As discussed above, we investigate the impact of 
policies that would lower the cost of the backstop (substitute) technologies at 
2% per year and 4% per year. 
 
 
Figure 2. Supportable emissions for alternative rates of technological change 
and no-policy scenario 
___________________________ 
 
Figure 2 compares the supportable policies for different technological 
assumptions. The “NoPol” is the standard DICE model with base 
technological change and no club. The policy scenarios are ones the three in 
the right-hand columns of Table 1: low policy, medium policy, and high 
policy. The low policy scenario has a moderate penalty tariff (5%) and the 
base technological assumptions. The medium and high policies have the high 
tariff (10%) plus the middle technology and the high technology 
assumptions, respectively. 
Even the LoPol improvement has a substantial impact on emissions. 
Looking at 2050 emissions, introducing the club lowers emissions from61 
GtCO2/yr to 36 GtCO2/yr. These decline to 9 GtCO2/yr with the middle 
variant and -8 GtCO2/yr for the high variant in 2050. In other words, with a 
maximal effort to improve non-carbon technologies along with strong 
































Another question is the relative power of decarbonization and 
decrease in the cost of the backstop technology. Table 2 shows the impact on 
2050 emissions of policies, starting from no policy, to four technological 
assumptions in a strong club. Both rapid decarbonization and a rapid 
improvement in the backstop technology improve on a strong club, although 
the backstop decline of 4% per year is slightly more powerful than more 




Table 2. Interaction technological policies and the climate club 
 
Impact of club size 
An important issue is the impact of different size clubs on the 
incentives to participate. For example, a small club will have little leverage 
because the penalty tariffs will have only a small economic impact on non-
participants. Conversely, a large club that covers most countries will have 
maximal power to induce countries to participate.  
To test the impact of club size, we examined the supportable emissions 
for club size from 0.01% to 99.9% of world trade. The results are shown in 
Figure 3 for 2050 emissions (using base parameters in Table 1). Not 
surprisingly, the larger the club, the lower the supportable emissions 
reductions. Additionally, the impact is non-linear, with a major reduction for 
even small club size. The non-linearity is shown in the analytical section 






Strong Club, Base Technologies 27.6
Strong Club, Rapid Decarbonization 8.6
Strong Club, Rapid Backstop Decline 2.4




Figure 3. Sustainable emissions in 2050 for different club sizes 
______________________________ 
The strong incentive of even small clubs is an encouraging feature, 
suggesting that a small group of countries with a modest fraction of world 
trade and emissions can start the process. This point is indeed the opposite of 
the current climate negotiations in the Conference of the Parties which are 
based on the principle of unanimity. In terms of the club theory, the current 
arrangement means that a single holdout can stymie a coalition and leave the 
world stuck up at point U in Figure 3.  
III. Effects of country heterogeneity in the TRICE model 
 The modeling of the TDICE model just described assumes identical 
countries. In reality, countries have different structures and therefore 
different benefits and costs, which would result in different supportable 
policies. A rough idea of the differences can be obtained by examining the 
key parameters for major regions. This model examines the behavior with 15 
regions and is called the TRICE model. 
What parameters are important to include in a regional model? The 
analytical model showed that the supportable policies will depend upon four 
parameters that differ across countries. These are openness, the welfare loss 
per unit tariff, the emissions-output ratio, the growth of total factor 
productivity, and the cost of the backstop technology. The dynamic model 
uses the same regional structure as the 2015 C-DICE model, with 15 regions 


































Russia, South Africa, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, US, and rest of 
world). The major parameters for each region are estimated from current 
data as described in the appendix.  
The regional models differ for the parameters described in the last 
paragraph (GDP, cost of backstop technology, openness, tariff vulnerabilities, 
abatement cost, emissions, TFP growth, decarbonization rate, etc.). However, 
they have identical structures for several parameters such as population 
growth, rate of decline of TFP growth and decarbonization, and (obviously) 
the global climate model. The varying parameters are contained in Appendix 
Table A-1. 
The results for the regional model are close but not identical to those 
for the aggregate model. For output, the initial levels are virtually exactly the 
same for the aggregated and regional versions. The growth rates over the 
2015-60 period are 2.79%/year and 2.92%/year, respectively.  
Figure 4 shows the results of the calculations for CO2 emissions for 
four policy/technological assumptions for the aggregated and the regional 
models. Emissions for the regional version grow between 0.2%/year and 
0.4%/year more rapidly that in the aggregated version.      
 
Figure 4. Effect of country heterogeneity on emissions for alternative 
assumptions 
The figure shows calculations of supportable policies the aggregate (DICE) 






























Base, RICE Base, DICE
Weak, RICE Weak, DICE
Mod, RICE Mod, DICE
Strong, RICE Strong, DICE
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Regional carbon prices 
A first important question that is addressed when allowing for country 
heterogeneity is the difference in supportable price across region. Table 3 
shows supportable carbon prices by region for the moderate climate policy. 
The calculations indicate that China and Russia have very low supportable 
carbon prices, in the order of $80/tCO2 in 2020. By contrast, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Eurasia have high supportable prices, over $200/tCO2 in 2020. 
The differences are primarily due to the emissions-output ratio and estimates 
of the cost of the backstop technology.  Note that they do not depend at all on 
estimates of damages. 
 
 
Table 3. Supportable target carbon prices by region, moderate climate 
policies 
Carbon price Laffer curve 
 Perhaps the most revealing result is the “carbon price Laffer curve,” 
shown in Figure 5. This shows the relationship between the target carbon 
price and total emissions reductions (using 2050 as an example). Here is the 
point: At a zero carbon price, there are no emissions reductions. As the target 
carbon price rises, all participating regions reduce emissions as a function of 
the carbon price. However, when the target carbon price passes a country’s 
supportable carbon price, the country drops out of the club, and the 
country’s emissions go to the non-cooperative level. When the target price 
Region 2015 2020 2050
World 139 148 221
Russia 68 72 97
Safrica 73 76 90
China 77 86 168
Brazil 91 91 85
EU 96 103 162
US 104 110 149
Canada 112 116 144
India 118 126 187
Japan 126 133 180
Mideast 138 141 159
SEAsia 161 173 256
LatAm 165 173 235
Eurasia 190 200 271
ROW 267 281 380
SSA 285 305 452
Wt average 101 109 170
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gets extremely high, there are no participants and therefore no emissions 
reductions. 
Figure 5 shows how the impact of participation on emissions 
reductions using the regional model for three different penalty tariffs (0%, 
5%, and 10%). Not surprising is that at 0% tariff the reductions and 
supportable carbon prices are extremely low and basically reflect the level of 
the non-cooperative policy. Additionally, the supportable prices rise with the 
penalty tariff. 
The interesting result is the shape of the carbon-price Laffer curve. The 
peak emissions reduction comes at $100/tCO2 for the 5% tariff and $160/ton 
for the 10% tariff (again, for the year 2050). The peak of the Laffer curve 
comes at a point that is close to the weighted average target price for 2050 of 
$170/tCO2, as seen in Table 3.  
As a final point, note that an international agreement on a climate club 
will need to respect the differing interests of regions. For example, it might 
be that the US represents the key player and designs a club that is at its 
supportable carbon price.  The price would be close to the average price 
shown in Table 3. A similar observation would apply to China. The 2050 
prices would be $149 or $168 per ton CO2 for the US and China. An 
alternative would be to choose the price that would maximize emissions 
reductions according to the carbon-price Laffer curve, which would be about 
$160/tCO2 in 2050. 
There might be arguments here about the best choice of a target carbon 
price. But the central point is that any of these would be far above the current 
global policy, which has an effective carbon price of around $5/tCO2. Even a 
fractious and rowdy club would be superior to the current policy under the 
Paris Accord of national policies, nationally determined, and without any 





Figure 5. Emissions reductions at different target carbon prices for three 
different penalty tariffs, 2050 
 
The sharp asymmetry of the curve arises for reasons unrelated to the 
structure of the club and is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the curve for 
both the aggregated and regional models. Note that the curve has a sharp 
discontinuity for the aggregated model, where the break occurs at the 
(single) supportable price for the (one region) global model. Since the 
regional model has multiple supportable prices, the breaks will be smoothed 
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Appendix on multi-region assumptions 
 The multi-region TRICE model is a marriage of the earlier C-DICE 
model and the TDICE model described above. The TRICE model has 15 
regions run in parallel but with different parameters as described below. The 
global averages are then the sum or the weighted averages of the 15 regions. 
The estimates have only an extremely small dependence on global variables 
(such as those determined by global climate change), so the errors of running 
independently are trivially small. The GAMS code is contained in the file 
Sources-Nordhaus-DynamicClub-091919.docx. 
The empirical structure of the TRICE model is similar to earlier 
versions of the RICE model (Nordhaus-Yang 1996, Nordhaus 2010). It uses 
the same structure as the TDICE model with region-specific parameters as 
follows: 
• The initial cost of the backstop technology varies by region 
according to the assumptions in the 2015 C-DICE model. 
• The initial openness parameter is based on data from the 2015 C-
DICE model and uses openness from 2011. 
• The welfare parameter is based on data from the 2015 C-DICE 
model and uses results from Ossa (2015) and trade data from 2011. 
• The value of the CO2-GDP ratio (sigma) is determined from output 
data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook database, with CO2 
emissions from the EU (EDGAR), with the latest available data 
from 2017. 
• Productivity growth by region uses output and population from 
IMF, World Economic Outlook database and take the initial growth 
rate at the average for the 2000-2018 period.  
• The rate of decarbonization uses data from the IMF and EDGAR for 
the period 1980-2017. 
All other parameters are identical for the TDICE and TRICE models. 
 The runs using the parameters above produced slight differences 
between the TRICE and TDICE versions. The parameters for TFP growth and 
decarbonization were adjusted slightly for China, India, the Mideast, and 
Southeast Asia to harmonize the aggregate and regional models. Table A-1 
shows the adjustments to harmonize the two models. The “original” are the 
estimates constructed from the data as described above and the “adjusted” 




Table A-1. Adjustments of parameters for regional model to harmonize with 
DICE-2016R3 in % per year for 2015-2020. 
 
 
  Initial growth TFP Initial rate of decarbonization
Region Original Adusted Original Adusted
China 3.4% 2.5% -0.5% -0.6%
India 2.4% 2.0% -0.1% -0.3%
Mideast 0.2% 0.0%
SEAsia -0.2% -0.3%
